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I. INTRODUCTION

During an investigation of criminal culpability, a law enforcement
agency is duty-bound to serve the public good.2 Similarly, in investigating
regulatory matters, an administrative agency must seek to enforce the
statutes under its delegated authority in the interest of the public good.3
While both administrative and law enforcement agencies have objectives
that center on the public good, a cause for concern arises when these entities
work together against an individual’s proprietary and civil rights.4 This
concern is exacerbated by the likelihood that constitutional rights could be
subverted in the quest to serve the public good.5
For example, with nominal oversight a law enforcement officer who
does not have a warrant can simply turn to an agency investigator who, in
his or her regulatory capacity, may conduct a warrantless search.6 This
1
Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University College of Law; J.D.,
Florida State University (1997).
2
See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 27 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
3
See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928).
4
See KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 521 (4th ed. 2004).
5
See id.
6
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978) (“[A]n exception from the search warrant
requirement [for administrative agencies] has been recognized for ‘pervasively regulated business[es],’
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action is enabled by the more relaxed requirements for search and seizure in
particular administrative investigations than for criminal investigations.7 In
short, an administrative agency has, in certain circumstances, unfettered
access to materials for which a higher burden of proof is required from the
law enforcement agency that desires to collect and examine such materials.8
In the event the officer does not have adequate information to serve
as the basis for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, he or she may
benefit from materials collected by the administrative agency – relying on
these as the basis for reasonable suspicion to initiate a criminal
investigation.9 The consequence seems clear: the regulatory powers of an
administrative agency can be used by law enforcement to circumvent due
process unless there are strict standards in place to detect and avoid the
complicity of the administrative agencies.10
In instances where such information exchange results in parallel
investigations by both agencies, one in which the individual’s rights become
abrogated, it is left to the affected party to raise and contest the
administrative agency’s action on a case-by-case basis.11 When an
individual is subject to the jurisdiction of an administrative agency, the
judicial branch has not regularly struck down parallel investigations.12 On
the contrary, such investigations have been consistently upheld under the
reasoning that the individual has either previously submitted to the
jurisdiction of the regulatory agency, or is conducting activities within the
purview of agency authority.13 Hence, the potential for the misuse of
authority by an administrative agency can be drastic, and ultimately
overlooked by the judiciary, as long as the administrative agency remains
within its statutory scope of authority.14
Now transpose the scenario and assume that it is a law enforcement
officer who takes an individual into custody for questioning regarding his or

and for ‘closely regulated’ industries ‘long subject to close supervision and inspection.’ These cases . . .
represent responses to relatively unique circumstances. Certain industries have such a history of
government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy [exists] . . . . [W]hen an entrepreneur
embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of
governmental regulation.”) (citations omitted).
7
See id. at 313.
8
See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–04 (1987) (finding that the warrantless
inspection of premises of “closely regulated” businesses is allowed for certain administrative purposes
without particularized suspicion of misconduct); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507–09 (1978)
(approving administrative inspection of fire-damaged premises to determine the cause of the blaze);
Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534–39 (1967) (approving administrative inspection to ensure
compliance with city housing code); see also Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000).
9
See, e.g., Burger, 482 U.S. at 716–17.
10
See DANIEL WEBB, ET AL., CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 14-6, 14-7 (1993).
11
See United States v. Gel Spice Co., 773 F.2d 427, 433–34 (2d Cir. 1985).
12
See Smith v. Richert, 35 F.3d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1994).
13
See id. at 303.
14
See WEBB, supra note 10, at 14-6, 14-7.
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her culpability on a criminal matter.15 In the event the officer learns that the
individual is subject to the regulatory authority of an administrative agency,
the officer may refer information regarding the individual’s actions to that
agency.16 On its own, the administrative agency can initiate a parallel
investigation within its delegated statutory authority to determine whether or
not any violations of its regulations occurred.17 As long as these
investigations remain separate, there does not seem to be a constitutional
infringement.18
Thus far, neither the judicial nor the legislative branch has
determined that there are any inherent problems with parallel
investigations.19 As such, a law enforcement agency can utilize nearly all
the information gathered from the administrative proceeding in a subsequent
criminal proceeding.20 However, in the event the administrative agency
conducts its investigation solely for the purpose of assisting the law
enforcement agency, the courts have made the distinction that these
instances do not constitute legitimate parallel investigations.21
The foregoing discussion begs the question as to the circumstances
under which administrative and law enforcement agencies should be
allowed to exchange information, and to what extent. Currently, no explicit
federal guidelines for parallel investigations by law enforcement and
administrative agencies can be found in the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), and judicial decisions on the issue remain sparse.22 In addition,
15

See generally Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
See Lewis v. United States, 70 F.3d 597, 600 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
See Choiniere v. United States, No. 3:07-CV-27 RM, 2009 WL 112585, at *7 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 14,
2009) (citing United States v. Med. House, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1531, 1537 (W.D. Mo. 1989)) (“Parallel or
overlapping criminal and civil investigations generally aren’t objectionable.”).
18
See United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138, 1140 (N.D. Ala. 2005) (citing Sterling
Nat’l Bank v. A-1 Hotels Int’l, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 573, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
19
See id. at 1140 (citing Sterling Nat’l Bank v. A-1 Hotels Int’l, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 573, 579
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)); see also SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Gary P. Naftalis, Defending Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
SM090 ALI-ABA 1257, 1314 (2007) (“The double jeopardy clause likely will [also] not have much of an
application in parallel or successive criminal and civil securities proceedings.”).
20
McQueen v. United States, 179 F.R.D. 522, 529 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (citing United States v. Sells
Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983); United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 479–80 (1983)) (“The most
common means by which an agency record becomes a ‘matter before a grand jury’ is when that record is
actually shown to the grand jury. It is irrelevant whether the record was initially gathered by a grand jury
subpoena or through an agency’s administrative investigation. In fact, many criminal cases are
originate[d] with an investigation by a[n] administrative agency other than the [Department of Justice].
When the agency refers the case to the [Department of Justice] for prosecution, it invariably transfers the
records it gathered in its investigation (administrative record). Much, if not all of that administrative
record is inevitably presented to the grand jury. At that point, it becomes incontrovertibly a ‘matter
before the grand jury’.”).
21
United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 314 (1978) (footnote omitted).
22
There are case-by-case examples that apply to particular agencies. See, e.g., Donaldson v. United
States, 400 U.S. 517, 529 (1971) (disallowing the intervention of an employee during an IRS
enforcement proceeding against an employer to obtain the employee’s tax records). But see Tiffany Fine
Arts, Inc. v. United States, 469 U.S. 310, 31516 (1985) (noting that Donaldson was superseded by
Congress’s amendment of the law to require that the IRS give the taxpayer notice and provide
intervention rights).
16
17
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the judicial system, as the equalizer of constitutional disparities, does not
always adequately convey the nuances of administrative and constitutional
principles to the lay individual.23
In the absence of more precise public policy guidelines or a judicial
standard for review, parallel investigatory issues will continue to remain
uncertain and subject to piecemeal interpretations.24 While a person trained
in the law may be able to navigate the problems associated with agency
investigations in case-by-case situations, it is essential for the average
person of common intelligence to comprehend his or her rights in that
system.25 With the foregoing in mind, this article will seek to address
problematic issues inherent in parallel administrative – law enforcement
investigations.
II. PARALLEL INVESTIGATIONS IN PUBLIC POLICY
Parallel investigations could be attractive to law enforcement
agencies for two main reasons. First, while the law enforcement agency
must generally have reasonable suspicion before an investigation, the
administrative agency does not typically need to fulfill this prerequisite.26
Rather, the administrative agency may have the authority to conduct an
investigation whether or not there is even evidence of a regulatory
infraction.27 Second, the public policy reasons for allowing administrative
oversight are broad enough to encompass materials that are under public
scrutiny and may additionally subject the affected party to criminal
culpability.28 In other words, obtaining these administrative materials may
solely serve to incriminate the affected party.29
According to the judiciary, the above-mentioned public policy
concerns do not interfere with an affected party’s rights when the parallel
investigations are conducted separately and independently.30 However,
when both the administrative and law enforcement agencies cooperate with
23

See WARREN, supra note 4, at 521.
See THOMAS R. VAN DERVORT, AMERICAN LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: EQUAL JUSTICE
UNDER THE LAW 311 (2d ed. 2000).
25
Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Comm’n, 505 F.2d 869, 872 (10th Cir. 1974)
(citing Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)); Bass Plating Co. v. Town of Windsor,
639 F. Supp. 873, 880 (D. Conn. 1986) (citing Fleming v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 713 F.2d 179, 184 (6th
Cir. 1983)) (“[W]hen the persons affected by the regulations are a select group with a specialized
understanding of the subject being regulated, the degree of definiteness required to satisfy due process is
measured by the common understanding and commercial knowledge of the group.”).
26
See Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland, 619 F. Supp. 2d 461, 47879 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
27
DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 88 (9th Cir. 1963) (“The investigative power granted
administrative agencies is inquisitorial in nature; its exercise does not depend upon a showing of
probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred. . . . [A]dministrative agencies charged with
enforcement of law, ‘can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not.’”) (footnotes omitted).
28
See generally Smith v. Richert, 35 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 1994).
29
See id. at 304.
30
See United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
24
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one another, the individual rights could readily be jeopardized.31 The
current legal framework fails to provide a clear opportunity to challenge the
parallel investigation when the individual rights are being circumvented or
diminished, unless there is actual evidence of agency interference.32
A. Delegated Authority of Administrative and Law Enforcement Agencies,
Respectively
Administrative agencies, granted enforcement authority by the
legislature, are guided by the operational principles outlined in the APA.33
While these agencies are afforded great deference in the interpretation of
their respective scope of authority,34 they must also abide by the limitations
of that authority.35 For, once the legislature clearly defines agency
standards, the delegated authority is intended to operate for and serve the
public good.36
As statutorily created entities, administrative agencies customarily
serve the following three major functions: 1) promulgating a rule – where an
agency is acting in a quasi-legislative (regulatory) capacity;37 2)
investigating and enforcing authority – where an agency is acting in its
executive (public) capacity38 (the resulting enforcement encompasses
penalties which are generally civil in nature);39 and 3) conducting hearings
and issuing orders on regulatory violations – where an agency is acting in a
quasi-judicial (adjudicatory) capacity.40
Law enforcement agencies, like administrative agencies, are also
created by statute, but with specific delegation of authority to investigate
and punish criminal culpability.41 As arms of the executive branch, both the
administrative and law enforcement agencies have prosecutorial discretion
upon the completion of their respective investigations.42 However, while an
31

Id. at 1138–39.
Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Comm’n, 505 F.2d 869, 87273 (10th Cir. 1974).
See 5 U.S.C. § 551–559, §701–706 (2006).
34
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
35
See, e.g., Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
36
See Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 222 (1989).
37
United States v. Williams, 691 F. Supp. 36, 50 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(5)
(2006).
38
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
39
See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 450
(1977); see also Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346, 1349 (5th Cir. 1970).
40
See Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 449–50; Kent, 425 F.2d at 1349. “The terms ‘quasi legislative’ and
‘quasi adjudicative’ indicate that the agency uses legislative like or court like procedures but that it is not,
constitutionally speaking, either a legislature or a court.” Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State
Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 774 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
41
See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 231 (1986); Spell v. McDaniel, 824
F.2d 1380, 1387 (4th Cir. 1987).
42
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515 (1978) (“The decision to initiate administrative proceedings
against an individual or corporation is very much like the prosecutor’s decision to initiate or move
forward with a criminal prosecution. An agency official, like a prosecutor, may have broad discretion in
deciding whether a proceeding should be brought and what sanctions should be sought.”).
32
33
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administrative agency has certain obligations that fall under the APA, the
primary function of the law enforcement agency is the investigation of
criminal activity that may implicate specific constitutional guarantees. This
is unlike “civil issues between the government and . . . individuals,”43 which
fall under the domain of administrative agencies. Whereas a law
enforcement agency is concerned with collecting information in order to
prosecute a crime,44 an administrative agency is concerned with regulatory
compliance.45
In carrying out their responsibilities, both agencies have obligations
to impartially abide by their statutory functions and objectives. In addition
to the adjudicatory means afforded under the APA, administrative agencies
operate predominately under civil means of enforcement, such as
compliance orders or citations.46 The overall goal is to monitor and ensure
compliance with predetermined policy considerations by way of remedial
measures, rather than resorting to a utilitarian or retributivist approach for
purposes of punishment.47 The differences between the investigatory
authority and methods of operation of law enforcement and administrative
agencies are authorized by the legislature and derived from the agencies’
respective functions.48
B. Regulatory Enforcement Authority and Individual Rights in Parallel
Investigations
In the case of regulatory enforcement, the civil and remedial aspects
have often served to the detriment of individual rights because they permit a
lesser degree of judicial justification than those warranted by the law
enforcement agency.49 The potential for misuse of authority by agencies,
that have both criminal and administrative investigatory powers, remains
problematic in the face of parallel investigations.50

43

JOHN D. DELEO, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 36–37 (2008).
Id. at 37.
45
Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 233.
46
Id. at 234; see also Old Timer, Inc. v. Blackhawk-Cent. City Sanitation Dist., 51 F. Supp. 2d
1109, 1113 (D. Colo. 1999). Contra David Blair-Loy, Judicial Neglect of the Statutory Basis for the
Rosario Rule: The Genesis of the Possession or Control Requirement, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 469, 479 (1997)
(“The distinction between ‘law enforcement’ and ‘administrative’ agencies is . . . artificial. The Court of
Appeals has never defined what is ‘primarily’ a law enforcement agency as opposed to what is
‘primarily’ an administrative agency, and its approach in practice seems little more than arbitrary.
Whether an agency’s administrative functions are primary and its law enforcement functions ‘incidental,’
or vice versa, appears to be purely in the eye of the beholder. The distinction between ‘law enforcement’
and ‘administrative’ agencies is therefore untenable as a matter of both theory and practice . . . .”)
(footnotes omitted).
47
See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 441 (1942); see also United States
v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536, 541–42 (10th Cir. 1994).
48
See Columbia Broad., 316 U.S. at 441; see also Hudson, 14 F.3d at 541–42.
49
FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 705–06 (1948); see also Kropp Forge Co. v. Sec’y of Labor,
657 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1981).
50
See WARREN, supra note 4, at 521.
44
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The civil and regulatory laws of the United States
frequently overlap with the criminal laws, creating the
possibility of parallel civil and criminal proceedings, either
successive or simultaneous. In the absence of substantial
prejudice to the rights of the parties involved, such parallel
proceedings are unobjectionable under our jurisprudence.
As long ago as 1912 the Supreme Court recognized that
under one statutory scheme that of the Sherman Act a
transaction or course of conduct could give rise to both
criminal proceedings and civil suits. The Court held that the
government could initiate such proceedings either
“simultaneously or successively,” with discretion in the
courts to prevent injury in particular cases. . . .
....
Effective enforcement of [such] laws requires that
[administrative and enforcement agencies] be able to
investigate possible violations simultaneously. . . If [an
administrative agency] suspects that a company has violated
the [laws under its delegated authority], it must be able to
respond quickly: it must be able to obtain relevant
information concerning the alleged violation and to seek
prompt judicial redress if necessary. Similarly, [a law
enforcement agency] must act quickly if it suspects that the
laws have been broken. Grand jury investigations take time,
as do criminal prosecutions. If [the law enforcement
agency] moves too slowly the statute of limitations may run,
witnesses may die or move away, memories may fade, or
enforcement resources may be diverted.
The
[administrative agency] cannot always wait for [the law
enforcement agency] to complete the criminal proceedings
if it is to obtain the necessary prompt civil remedy; neither
can [the law enforcement agency] always await the
conclusion of the civil proceeding without endangering its
criminal case. Thus [the court] should not block parallel
investigations by these agencies in the absence of “special
circumstances” in which the nature of the proceedings
demonstrably prejudices substantial rights of the
investigated party or of the government.51
The courts have routinely stated that parallel investigations do not
infringe on personal liberties, or demonstrate prejudice to the substantial
51

SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1374, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citations and footnotes
omitted); see also United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1970).
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rights of an affected party so long as they are conducted in “good faith.”52
In other words, so long as a law enforcement agency refers a matter to an
administrative agency without further interfering with that agency’s
operations in obtaining information, there are no constitutional problems in
utilizing any information collected by the administrative agency in a
subsequent criminal prosecution.53 The law enforcement agency does not
necessarily need to specify a reason for the referral, if it is within the
purview of authority of the administrative agency to act upon the referral.54
However, standards for the determination of “good faith” are unclear.”55 As
a consequence, the burden to show a lack of good faith on the part of the
agencies shifts to the affected party.56
Upon the completion of an investigation, both the administrative
and law enforcement agencies can exchange collected information without
due notice to the affected party.57 However, a court’s reluctance to encroach
on the legislature’s delegation of authority causes a lack of specific
oversight on the exchange.58 This leaves unanswered an important question
for the affected individual as to whether or not cautionary prerequisites
should be imposed on the law enforcement agency’s use of the collected
information.59 This is concerning. The lower standards required for the
issuance of an administrative subpoena as opposed to a search warrant, for
example, could allow a law enforcement agency to use the administrative
agency’s information to build a criminal case with little or no regard for
Fourth Amendment ramifications.60
The purview of the law enforcement agency is therefore arguably
enhanced beyond the scope of its original statutory delegation, reaching into
the protected rights of a suspect simply because he or she is subject to the
regulatory authority of an administrative agency.61 Presently, however, the
overlap between administrative and law enforcement investigations is seen
by the courts as merely a side-effect of our system of justice; so long as each
entity is conducting its affairs under its own authority, there is no

52
See United States v. Gel Spice Co., 773 F.2d 427, 433 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Med.
House, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1531, 1537 (W.D. Mo. 1989); United States v. Copple, 827 F.2d 1182, 1189
(8th Cir. 1987).
53
See Gel Spice, 773 F.2d at 433; Med. House, 736 F. Supp. at 1537; Copple, 827 F.2d at 1189.
54
See Gel Spice, 773 F.2d at 434; Med. House, 736 F. Supp. at 1535; Copple, 827 F.2d at 1189.
55
See Gel Spice, 773 F.2d at 433; Med. House, 736 F. Supp. at 1537; Copple, 827 F.2d at 1189.
56
See Gel Spice, 773 F.2d at 433; Med. House, 736 F. Supp. at 1536; Copple, 827 F.2d at 1189.
57
See Gel Spice, 773 F.2d at 432; Med. House, 736 F. Supp. at 1537; Copple, 827 F.2d at 1189.
58
See Gel Spice, 773 F.2d at 433; Med. House, 736 F. Supp. at 1537; Copple, 827 F.2d at 1189.
59
See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967). The Supreme Court noted the
constitutional encroachment of administrative subpoenas for health and safety inspections of private
dwellings requires probable cause. Id. at 534. But it also noted its concern that administrative subpoenas
lacked oversight by a neutral magistrate. Id. at 532–33.
60
Id. at 539.
61
Id. at 533.
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disparaging effect on the rights of the individual.62
C. Expansion of the Administrative State, Information Exchange and the
Protection of Individual Rights
The rise of the administrative state expanded the number of areas in
which the government has oversight for the purpose of public protection.63
However, with this expansion there was not a proportionate increase in the
judicial and congressional oversight needed to ensure that individual
constitutional rights are preserved.64
Considering the extent of
administrative authority vested in the executive branch, coupled with the
authority to investigate criminal culpability, protecting an individual’s rights
can be extremely foreboding.65 While an administrative agency is not
constitutionally a fourth branch of government,66 it acts as such through the
promulgation of rules, enforcement of its authority and policies, and, with
great deference, review of its own decisions.67 As Kenneth F. Warren
explained:
[I]t would be patently naive to hold that administrative
actions cannot result in the severe deprivation of a person’s
personal liberties since Congress, as well as state
legislatures, has delegated to administrators the power to
inflict grave punishments upon individuals or corporate
persons without providing them with the benefit of
62
See SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1376–77 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also United States
v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
63
See VAN DERVORT, supra note 24, at 311.
64
See Marc Chase McAllister, Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action: Should America
Adopt the German model?, in 2 ANNUAL OF GERMAN AND EUROPEAN LAW 88 (Russell A. Miller & Peer
Zumbansen eds. 2006) (“Because administrative agencies engage in lawmaking processes, some form of
institutional check upon their activities is necessary to ensure that agencies do not run roughshod over
individual rights and liberties.”); SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, NO LONGER DISABLED: THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 14 (1988) (“The reliance on judicial scrutiny of
agency action to protect individual rights has evolved with the rise of the modern administrative state.
Judicial review of administrative procedure frequently involves balancing the enhanced protection of
individual rights against the possible loss of bureaucratic efficiency and expertise resulting from judicial
oversight. Despite its potential interference with bureaucratic autonomy, judicial review has become
more prevalent as ‘courts are increasingly asked to review administrati[ve] action that touches on
fundamental personal interests in life, health, and liberty . . . .’”) (citation omitted).
65
E.P. Krauss, Unchecked Powers: The Supreme Court and Administrative Law, 75 MARQ. L. REV.
797, 813 (1992) (noting that “[t]he checks and balances that in theory are supposed to limit the power of
government have not been utilized by the Court to keep the power of administrative agencies in check.”);
see also Matthew S. Melamed, A Theoretical Justification for Special Solicitude: States and the
Administrative State, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 577, 607 (2010) (“Agencies are
Frankensteins—conceived by the legislative branch, only, upon birth, to become entities over which that
branch can assert little, if any, control. Thus, judicial review is necessary to preserve our constitutional
scheme, lest agencies act as a fourth branch of government, politically unaccountable to states and
largely insulated from congressional control.”).
66
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 986 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Schweiker v. Gray
Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43—44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977)).
67
See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 773 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
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independent judicial judgment. Consequently, concerned
observers have begun to question very seriously how fair it
is to deny persons constitutional due process protections in
certain situations just because the proceedings are labeled
“civil” instead of “criminal.”68
In the separation of authority, the legitimate branches of government
have either contributed to the expansion of the administrative state without
assessing its effect on individual rights, or created a distinction between
individual rights and regulatory requirements protecting the public’s
welfare.69 Agencies seeking to protect the public under their delegated
authority have effective tools for enforcement.70 Furthermore, each agency
has a responsibility to adequately investigate and enforce the provisions
under its delegated authority.71 Yet, an agency’s responsibility stops short
of an analysis of how its authority affects the due process rights of the
individual in parallel investigations.72
As noted earlier, upon completion of an investigation, an agency
may share all of the material it collected within the scope of its authority,
subject to confidentiality concerns.73 Unfortunately, however, there is no
broad-based affirmative safeguard to control the exchange of information.74
Hence, when the administrative agency collects information from the
regulated public, a law enforcement agency may request access to that
information and thereby circumvent its separate requirements for

68

See WARREN, supra note 4, at 520–21 (citations omitted).
Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1204 (2008)
(“Congress provided . . . for the protection of individual rights with the judicial review provisions of the
APA, which contemplate a broad judicial role in checking agency utilization of delegated power.”)
(citations omitted); Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court has Indirectly
Effected a Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689, 721 (2006) (“An examination of
constitutional history shows that a system of separation of powers exists not just as an organizational
model for democratic government. It is also the primary means by which to ensure the protection of
individual liberty. But this aspect of separation of powers has been largely ignored in modern
constitutional law. Instead of protecting the separation of powers as a means of protecting individual
rights, the Court has turned its sights almost completely on the articulation of a vast array of substantive
rights. It has created new privacy rights and new substantive due process rights, rather than relying on
the structural or procedural safeguards built into the Constitution by the Framers.”).
70
See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
71
See id.
72
See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 43233 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 53841 (1935) (establishing that agencies have limitations on their authority).
73
See United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 442 (1983); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 292–93 (1979); United States v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 186 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 1999);
Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 907 (8th Cir. 1979); Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. v. FTC, 496 F.
Supp. 838, 844 (N.D. Ind. 1980); see generally Sara Levy, The Patriot Act Grand Jury Disclosure
Exception: A Proposal for Reconciling Civil Liberty and Law Enforcement Concerns, 5 CHI.-KENT J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 2, (2005); see also Elias C. Selinger, Comment, An Unredeemed Promise: How
Courts can Prevent Offensive Collateral Estoppel from Undercutting the Policy Goals of Amended
Federal Rule of Evidence 408, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1953, 1963–72 (2008).
74
See Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 464–66 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
69
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independent reasonable suspicion or probable cause.75 Essentially, by
grouping and interpreting the authority of these entities under the executive
branch, the other branches have done the public a disservice, especially
since the investigatory authorities are subjected to differing standards.76
[A]s regulation as expanded and intensified, legislative and
judicial authorities have conferred broad investigative
powers to practically all administrative agencies.
Statutes usually grant an agency the power to use a
variety of methods in carrying out its fact-finding functions.
These methods include requirements of reports from
regulated businesses, the conducting of inspections, and the
use of judicially enforced subpoenas. Failure to comply
with agency requests for information is usually dealt with
swiftly by easily obtained court orders requiring
compliance.
....
The power to investigate is one of the functions that
distinguishes the administrative law process from the
traditional civil law process. The administrative law
process is more like the criminal law process in that the
investigative power gives government agencies a standing
right to monitor and detect violations of rules.77
It is imperative that the sharing of investigatory material between
the authorized enforcement agencies be scrutinized. Specific standards must
be implemented by the legislature or judiciary that would readily allow
affected parties the ability to prevent the use of such information.78 In the
absence of such scrutiny and action, an affected party facing agency
investigation must fear the disclosure of required administrative records
because he or she may not afterward be entitled to Fifth Amendment
protection in a subsequent criminal prosecution.79
To safeguard against an individual’s loss of rights, the judicial
branch should take an active role in the exchange of this information, and
75
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1978) (noting that during an administrative
agency investigation, “[p]robable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. For purposes of an
administrative search . . . probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based not only on
specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that ‘reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
[establishment]’”) (citations omitted); see also Abraham Tabaie, Note, Protecting Privacy Expectations
and Personal Documents in SEC Investigations, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 799 (2008).
76
See VAN DERVORT, supra note 24, at 311.
77
Id.
78
See Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW
LANDSCAPE 197–98 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds. 1997).
79
JOHN F.COONEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES DESKBOOK 51 (1996).
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not leave the burden solely on the affected party to prove a lack of good
faith.80 The legislative branch is also in the primary position to develop
statutes that would limit the delegated authority of administrative agencies
to freely share material that was gathered under standards that do not rise to
the level of full constitutional protection.81 When either the administrative
or law enforcement agency requests information from the other, with intent
to utilize such in its own proceedings, both branches should have
mechanisms in place that scrutinize the exchange and use of such
information. To presume that these agencies have general public safety
policy objectives should not justify the end result of circumventing an
individual’s rights.82
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA
The ability of an administrative agency to obtain information from a
regulated party is patently less cumbersome than the law enforcement
requirement of probable cause.83 The primary tool for accessing this
information is through the use of an administrative subpoena. 84 An
administrative agency has expansive authority to investigate complaints and
conduct reviews using warrantless searches and seizures.85 It further has the
ability to collect and secure information that would not otherwise be readily
accessible to a law enforcement agency.86
Likewise, information collected by a law enforcement agency that is
precluded by the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine may otherwise be
used by the administrative agency during its proceedings.87 The Supreme
Court has explained that an administrative agency need not demonstrate
“[probable] cause in the criminal law sense” to obtain a
warrant to inspect property for compliance with a regulatory
scheme. Rather, an administrative warrant may [be]
issue[d] “not only on specific evidence of an existing
violation but also on a showing that ‘reasonable legislative
or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection
are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].’”88
Although the potential for abuse is clear, whether through political or
vindictive motives, the system has relied on the good faith standard for use
80

See Martin v. Gard, 811 F. Supp. 616, 621–24 (D. Kan. 1993).
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 974, 986–87 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
82
Id. at 973.
83
See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978) (citation omitted).
84
See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
85
Id.
86
See Smith v. Richert, 35 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1994).
87
See Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998).
88
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 252 n.14 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (alteration in original; citations omitted).
81
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of the subpoena during an initial independent investigation, even where
these motives may be considered suspect, and run counter to Fourth
Amendment rights.89
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures by requiring in most instances that a
search warrant be obtained before a physical search for
evidence is conducted . . . . Agencies can conduct
warrantless searches in several situations. Warrants are not
required to conduct searches in certain highly regulated
industries. Firms that sell firearms or liquor, for example,
are automatically subject to inspections without warrants.
Sometimes, a statute permits warrantless searches of certain
types of hazardous operations, such as coal mines . . . . A
warrantless inspection might . . . be considered reasonable
in emergency situations . . . .90
In order for an administrative agency to properly function in
protecting the public welfare, it needs to have the freedom to collect
information from regulated individuals or entities.91 Gathering information
may involve regulatory goods and services in accordance with specific
standards, or studying the accounting materials of a corporation to ensure
compliance with record-keeping procedures.92
The danger in the
accumulation of such information lies in its sheer enormity, and the ability
of the agency to collect the information “at will.”93 From the agency’s
perspective, the information is vital to its essential function of regulating a
particular industry or profession.94
However, from the perspective of individuals and entities, the
readily identifiable cost, in light of the agency authority, seems to be in the
form of an accepted encroachment into their sphere of personal rights.95 The
court system has effectively reduced, or reinterpreted, these rights in the
name of regulatory efficiency.96 Where the rights of the individual have to
be balanced against the public welfare, the regulatory efforts have
increasingly found support in both the legislative and judicial branches.97 It
89

SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corp., No. 80-1375, 1980 WL 8157, at *10 (3rd Cir. Aug. 27,
1980) (“[A] court should not decline to enforce a summons issued by that agency simply because it does
not approve of the political objectives that prompted a public official to call to the attention of the agency
instances of possible wrong doing. It is not the identity or political motivations of informants that should
determine whether the agency’s subpoenas are to be enforced, but whether the agency has made an
independent, good faith decision to commence action.”).
90
FRANK B. CROSS & ROGER MILLER, THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS 129 (7th ed. 2009).
91
See WARREN, supra note 4, at 527.
92
See id. at 527–29.
93
See id. at 527.
94
See id.
95
See id. at 558.
96
See id.
97
See id.
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is argued that in the area of administrative subpoenas, individual rights are
either seemingly non-existent, or must be affirmatively defended.98 Courts
have declined to bar administrative subpoenas despite the possibility that a
criminal investigation will ensue, or that the evidence gathered may become
relevant in a subsequent criminal proceeding:99
Administrative subpoenas are not a traditional tool of
criminal law investigation, but neither are they unknown.
Administrative subpoenas and criminal law overlap in at
least [three] areas. First, under some administrative regimes
it is a crime to fail to comply with an agency subpoena or
with a court order secured to enforce it. Second, most
administrative schemes are subject to criminal prohibitions
for program-related misconduct of one kind or another, such
as bribery or false statements, or for flagrant recalcitrance of
those subject to regulatory direction. In this mix, agency
subpoenas usually produce the grist for the administrative
mill, but occasionally unearth evidence that forms the basis
for a referral to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution. Third, in an increasing number of situations,
administrative subpoenas may be used for purposes of
conducting a criminal investigation.100
Indeed, there are numerous statutes that authorize both
administrative agency subpoenas,101 as well as the use of these subpoenas
The standard for allowing these
during criminal investigations.102
warrantless searches is that the search itself, though not originally for the
purposes of law enforcement, was nevertheless authorized by law.103
Customarily, the government’s intrusion is upheld under the scope of the
Fourth Amendment where the subpoena is issued “within the authority of
the agency, [and] the demand is not too indefinite and the information

98
See United States v. Merit Petroleum, Inc., 731 F.2d 901, 906 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984)
(quoting United States v. Thriftyman, Inc., 704 F.2d 1240, 1249 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983))
(“Subpoena enforcement proceedings are not intended to be ‘exhaustive inquisitions into the practices of
regulatory agencies.’”).
99
See United States v. Copple, 827 F.2d 1182, 1189 (8th Cir. 1987) (“An administrative agency
investigation is not improper merely because it seeks evidence that by its nature could be relevant to a
civil as well as to a potential criminal proceeding.”); Martin v. Gard, 811 F. Supp. 616, 624 (D. Kan.
1993).
100
Charles Doyle, Administrative Subpoenas and National Security Letters in Criminal and Foreign
Intelligence Investigations: Background and Proposed Adjustments, in NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES 4
(Daniel D. Pegarkov ed. 2006).
101
Id. at 5 (“There are now over 300 instances where federal agencies have been granted
administrative subpoena power in one form or another.”) (footnote omitted).
102
Id. at 4 (“(1) 18 U.S.C. 3486 (administrative subpoenas in certain health care fraud, child abuse,
and Secret Service protection cases); (2) 21 U.S.C. 876 (Controlled Substances Act cases); and (3) 5
U.S.C.App.(III) 6 (Inspector General investigations).”) (footnote omitted).
103
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
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sought is reasonably relevant.”104 After issuance, the affected party has the
burden of showing unreasonableness.105
Despite the constitutional guarantees, in the case of a parallel
investigation the law enforcement agency may encroach upon the
protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment because the delineation
between each entity’s entitlements to the information may not always be
clear.106 In other words, while the courts have followed the standard for
reasonableness in issuing administrative subpoenas, they have not
articulated a clear rationale for a law enforcement agency’s entitlement to
the administrative agency’s collected information as it pertains to a
subsequent criminal proceeding.107 What is lacking is a sound system of
checks and balances, since the authority of both types of agencies are
interpreted and enforced under the auspices of the executive branch.108
A. Public Protection and the Good Faith Standard
The current public policy climate appears to favor the use of
administrative jurisdiction to justify or assist in criminal investigations, the
most common exemplification being that of counter-terrorism intelligence
gathering.109 While there appears to be no public disclosures of these
investigations and tactics as they relate to other areas of legal violations, the
potential danger of agency misconduct cannot be dismissed as nonexistent
or implausible.110
Maneuvering between the legal nuances of an
administrative agency and a law enforcement agency can be cumbersome
for the individual and the courts, which calls into question whether the
public welfare is truly being protected.111

104

Id.
Id. at 652–53.
106
ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS
98–99 (5th ed. 2006).
107
See id.
108
See id.
109
See WARREN, supra note 4, at 576 (“Signed into law on October 26, 2001, the [USA PATRIOT
Act or Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act] is amazingly complex and comprehensive. . . . [Its purpose is to provide] ‘tools
to intercept and obstruct terrorism’; whether the tools are appropriate from a democratic and
constitutional perspective remains a hot debate. In addition to greatly increasing the power of [some 40
different] agencies to conduct administrative/criminal searches and seizures through the use of a variety
of traditional and high-tech electronic surveillance means, the act . . . severely limits judicial review of
these searches. . . . [It] gives the attorney general broad discretionary powers to . . . interpret and apply
the meaning of what constitutes a terrorist or terrorist group under the act; decide whether certain persons
or organizations should be targeted in terrorist investigations; determine whether the financial assets of
suspected terrorists, terrorist organizations, or those supporting terrorists or terrorist groups should be
frozen; and whether certain aliens should be detained or deported because they are suspected of being
terrorists or having ties with terrorists.”) (footnotes omitted).
110
See United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1139 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
111
Dolfi v. Pontesso, 156 F.3d 696, 700 (6th Cir. 1998) (“The special deference [given to
administrative interpretation, for example,] . . . is based on the expertise of an administrative agency in a
complex field of regulation with nuances perhaps unfamiliar to the federal courts . . . Unlike
105
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For instance, one common airport screening method is to utilize
profiling to compile information about airline passengers. Though initially
employed by an administrative agency as a counter-terrorism initiative, it is
conceivable that the information collected through the profiling could be
readily disclosed to law enforcement agencies.112 Such sharing would skirt
privacy issues, especially where the purpose of the regulation is to serve the
public good.113 Although not widely acknowledged, the potential for this
type of information exchange is real, and has already occurred under a
federal program entitled “Operation Talon.”114 This program allowed for the
exchange of information from agencies maintaining welfare records to law
enforcement officers.115 Recipients with active warrants were asked to
report to a local food stamp office to either correct a “problem with their
benefits” or to collect a prize, and were apprehended upon arrival.116
Given the perception of public good, affected parties are less likely
to prevail in challenging the parallel investigation under the good faith
standard, or in preventing the exchange of information.117 From the
administrative agency’s perspective, there appears to be the presumption of
good faith until the individual can prove otherwise.118 However, the nature
of the administrative proceeding is daunting from a constitutional
perspective, even absent the prospect of a parallel investigation.119 The
environmental regulation or occupational safety, criminal law and the interpretation of criminal statutes
is the bread and butter of the work of federal courts.”) (citation omitted).
112
See Deborah von Rochow-Leuschner, CAPPS II and the Fourth Amendment: Does it Fly?, 69 J.
AIR L. & COM. 139, 163–64 (2004).
113
See id.
114
See Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 669–
70 (2009).
115
Id.
116
Id. at 670 (“Operation Talon transformed food stamp offices into the sites of sting operations for
arresting aid recipients with outstanding arrest warrants and facilitated use of welfare administrative data
to capture low-income individuals who are wanted by the criminal justice system. Through this program
the welfare system has become an extension of the criminal justice system, transforming the welfare
system into a trap for hungry lawbreakers.”).
117
United States v. Rodriguez, Crim. No. 92–259(RLA), 1993 WL 34641, at *2 (D. P.R. Feb. 2,
1993) (“The caselaw on the investigatory authority of administrative agencies has hardly allowed
suppression when a legitimate or good faith investigation is challenged under improper purpose
standards. This is more so when it falls within the realm of the authority and purpose of the agency
creation. If the investigation may lead to civil, administrative or even criminal liability for violations is
but one of the alternatives allowed.”) (citations omitted).
118
Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The
presumption that government officials act in good faith is nothing new to our jurisprudence.”) (citation
omitted); TK-7 Corp. v. FTC, 738 F. Supp. 446, 449 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (“In performing its law
enforcement duties, an administrative agency is entitled to a presumption of regularity, i.e., that it will
discharge diligently and in good faith its responsibilities under the law.”) (citations omitted).
119
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 473 (1944) (“In the enforcement of administrative orders
the courts have been assiduous, perhaps at times extremely so, to see that constitutional protections to the
persons affected are observed.”) (footnote omitted); Salgado-Diaz v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th
Cir. 2005) (“Immigration proceedings, although not subject to the full range of constitutional protections,
must conform to the Fifth Amendment's requirement of due process.”) (citation omitted); Sealed v.
Sealed, 332 F.3d 51, 56 (2nd Cir. 2003) (“Where the administrative scheme does not require a certain
outcome, but merely authorizes particular actions and remedies, the scheme does not create
‘entitlements’ that receive constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (emphasis in
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threat of an individual’s constitutional liberties being diminished through
administrative proceedings cannot be minimized.120
With this in mind, the good faith standard should be more carefully
weighed toward the possibility that a law enforcement agency’s prosecution
has the potential to deprive an individual of his or her civil liberties.121 As
such, the judiciary should scrutinize the good faith standard in light of the
fact that the deprivation in a criminal proceeding can be predicated on
administrative findings.122 Fundamentally, it is the responsibility of the
other governmental branches to limit the executive branch’s authority in the
administrative arena in order to avoid a potential misuse of power.123
B. Parallel Investigations and the Notion of Good Faith
The legitimacy of parallel investigations finds justification in the
unique purpose of each agency’s investigation.124
Obviously, the
administrative agency cannot merely conduct an investigation with the
immediate objective of delivering this information to the law enforcement
agency.125 “An administrative agency investigation is not improper merely
because it seeks evidence that by its nature could be relevant to a civil as
well as to a potential criminal proceeding.”126 However, “if the subject of
[an] investigation could establish that [an] administrative summons was
issued for an improper purpose—that is, solely to gather evidence for a
criminal investigation—the summons would be unenforceable.”127 Yet the
judicial branch, thus far, has been reluctant to interfere where the good faith
standard has been met.128 As long as the agency’s objectives are
accomplished “pursuant to a valid administrative scheme and not for the
purpose of gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution,” the investigation

original) (citation omitted); Bardeau v. Meadows, Civil Action No. 7:08-cv-00486, 2008 WL 4057310, at
*2 (W.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2008) (“Because administrative proceedings such as prison disciplinary
proceedings are not tantamount to a criminal charge or trial, prisoners charged with disciplinary
infractions do not have the same constitutional procedural protections as does a criminal defendant.”)
(citation omitted).
120
See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 437–39; Salgado-Diaz, 395 F.3d at 1162; Sealed, 332 F.3d at 56; Bardeau,
2008 WL 4057310, at *2; see also Shiv Persaud, Deconstructing the Bill of Rights in Administrative
Adjudication – Enfranchising Constitutional Principles in the Process, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 369, 37071
(2009).
121
See McQueen v. United States, 179 F.R.D. 522, 528–31 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
122
Id. at 531–32.
123
See Krauss, supra note 65, at 797–99.
124
See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 99 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125
See id. at 73 (majority opinion).
126
United States v. Copple, 827 F.2d 1182, 1189 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Donaldson v. United States,
400 U.S. 517, 53233 (1971); United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 568 (8th Cir. 1969)).
127
WEBB, supra note 10, at 14-6.
128
Id. at 14-614-8 (“Rather than focus on the due process considerations, the Court’s analysis [has]
centered on [the agency’s authority to issue summonses] . . . . [However,] courts have routinely rejected
the application of the improper purpose doctrine outside the context of parallel IRS proceedings. . . .
Moreover, many federal agencies are explicitly authorized to work with the Department of Justice
through their Inspectors General which have broad administrative investigatory authority.”).
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has been deemed legitimate.129 The potential infringement upon the rights
of the affected party in other proceedings that could follow from an open
exchange of information between agencies is not enough to overcome the
good faith standard.130
Ultimately, the burden appears to remain with the affected party to
show that the parallel investigation was conducted in bad faith.131 An
unsupported accusation alone will not require the agency to justify its
investigation beyond showing proper adherence to delegated authority.132
“Mere allegations are not enough to put the agency’s good faith in issue, or
to raise a substantial question of abuse.”133 First, an affected party must
clearly demonstrate an instance of selective prosecution by the agency.134
Next, the party must show that the agency is not conducting investigations
against others who are similarly situated and committing the same acts.135
And, even if there is evidence of bad faith, the courts may still justify an
administrative inspection, as long as that inspection is properly within their
statutory authority.136
Despite the broad investigatory authority, an
administrative agency’s subpoena power is not limitless.
Rather the Fourth Amendment demands that the
investigation be conducted pursuant to a legitimate,
Congressionally authorized purpose and that the subpoena
be relevant to that purpose. Further, the necessary statutory
procedures must be followed and the information sought
must not be already within the agency’s possession.
....
. . . [For example, a taxpayer cannot argue] that an
Internal Revenue summons could not be utilized in aid of an
investigation that potentially might result in a
recommendation of criminal prosecution. . . . [S]o long as
the summons was issued in good faith pursuant to a
Congressionally authorized purpose and prior to a referral to
the Department of Justice, it [is] enforceable.
....
[Indeed,] [t]he better analysis is one in which the
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

United States v. Gel Spice Co., 773 F.2d 427, 433 (2nd Cir. 1985).
Id. at 432.
See Martin v. Gard, 811 F. Supp. 616, 624 (D. Kan. 1993) (citations omitted).
See id.
See id. (citations omitted).
See Comptroller of Currency v. Lance, 632 F. Supp. 437, 443 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
See id.
See generally People v. Weems, No. B168721, 2004 WL 2526429 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2004).
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court looks to the circumstances of the particular case to
assess the nonreferring agency’s role in the criminal
investigation. The court must determine whether the sole
purpose of the nonreferring agency’s investigation and
subpoena is to gather evidence for the criminal investigation
or whether the subpoena was issued in good faith pursuit of
a Congressionally authorized purpose.137
Essentially, the judiciary’s primary focus is on the distinction
between the investigations according to each agency’s delegated authority
without consideration of the good faith standard on individual rights.138 This
places the investigations within procedural boundaries without looking at
the private consequence.139 Additionally, in cases involving parallel
investigations where the private consequences of civil and criminal acts are
intertwined, it is the “Federal courts [that] have supervisory authority over
the manner in which Federal agents exercise their power. . . . To be parallel,
by definition, the separate investigations should be like the side-by-side train
tracks that never intersect.”140 But does this always occur? The following
example helps to shed some light on the issue.
In a case that came before the United States District Court of
Alabama regarding an administrative investigation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) concerning accounting fraud, a defendant
learned that the agency was conducting a parallel investigation in
conjunction with the Department of Justice.141 The defendant moved to
suppress a deposition that was conducted by the SEC during the subsequent
criminal proceeding for perjury.142 The court employed the good faith
standard, and required the defendant to demonstrate that the parallel
proceeding would either violate his constitutional rights or “depart from the
proper administration of criminal justice.”143
The court recognized that the location of the deposition was moved
by the SEC to accommodate agents from the justice department, and that the
defendant was questioned regarding a criminal investigation that had not
been disclosed.144 Because of these actions, it concluded that the
administrative agency acted with bad faith in conducting the deposition.145
This finding was based on the premise that the civil investigation had
137
SEC v. OKC Corp., 474 F.Supp. 1031, 1034, 103738 (D. Tex. 1979) (in the matter of an
application to enforce administrative subpoena duces tecum of the SEC) (citations omitted).
138
United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
139
See id.
140
Id. at 1137–39 (asserting there does not appear to be “any controlling law . . . [that] distinguishes a
legitimate, parallel investigation from an improper one.”).
141
Id. at 1135.
142
Id. at 1137.
143
Id. at 1138 (citations and emphasis omitted).
144
Id. at 1139.
145
Id. at 1140.

Published by eCommons, 2013

96

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

become “inescapably intertwined with the criminal investigation[,]” a
commingling that “negated the existence of [the] parallel [nature of the]
investigations.”146
From the court’s reasoning, it appears that the good faith standard
was treated as though it were a presumption that must be overcome by the
affected party.147 In other words, the affected party must provide clear
evidence of bad faith against an inherent notion of fairness.148 Specifically,
the evidence must essentially rise to the level of irrefutability, proving that
the sole purpose of the administrative action was to assist the parallel
criminal prosecution.149
In a separate case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky considered the
cooperation of a local sheriff’s office and a state licensing agency in a drug
While responding to neighborhood complaints regarding
bust. 150
individuals loitering outside a medical clinic, the sheriff’s office began an
investigation in conjunction with an administrative licensing agency for the
suspected sale of illegal narcotics.151 The administrative agency utilized its
subpoena power to search the premises under the direction of the law
enforcement agency.152 During the search, the enforcement investigators
accompanied the administrative investigators and even directed them as to
which files to procure.153 The court found that the administrative
investigation was “inextricably entwined” with the enforcement objectives,
even though it admitted the statements made during the illegal search.154
In a separate case, the Third Circuit stated:
If the court concludes that an administrative subpoena has
been issued for the purpose of developing a criminal case it
will decline enforcement. [The reasoning is similar i]n the
grand jury context[, where] a court will not enforce a
subpoena if its purpose is to gather evidence for a pending
criminal indictment or information. A court will not
enforce a grand jury subpoena if the grand jury is not
pursuing an investigation in good faith or is motivated by a
desire to harass an individual.155
With regards to bad faith, the terms used by the courts, such as
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Id.
Id. at 1138 (citations and emphasis omitted).
See id. (citations and emphasis omitted).
See SEC v. OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (citations omitted).
Williams v. Commonwealth, 213 S.W.3d 671, 673–74. (Ky. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 677.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 67677.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 1973) (citations omitted).
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“inescapably intertwined,”156 “‘trickery’ or cloaking,”157 “a desire to
harass,”158 or “a substantial question of abuse”159 remain broad enough to
essentially require specific evidence of malicious intent on the part of the
government.160 As the judicial branch has not been inclined to interfere with
the enforcement of an agency’s subpoena during a parallel investigation,
these terms should, at the very least, be streamlined in light of this overall
noninterventionist stance in construing an administrative enforcement
scheme.161
Furthermore, the public purpose served through regulatory authority
should encompass clearly defined procedures and protocols to prevent the
subsequent use of collected materials, which the administrative agency’s
investigation was not designed to accomplish.162 The legitimacy of arguing
that administrative agencies are not a fourth branch government lies in the
fact that the other branches have supreme oversight over encroachment and
misuse of authority.163 This being the case, the good faith standard should
not have to rise to the level of an “improper purpose” or constitute an “abuse
of process” on the part of the agency before an individual can seek remedy
against parallel investigations.164 The judiciary and legislature should revisit
the statutory policies to determine whether they have provided these
agencies too much authority. In the absence of such examination, the
standard of good faith would simply be tantamount to evidence that the
agency acted beyond the scope of its delegated authority.165 As long as
agencies appear to act within their statutory boundaries, the courts seem
156

United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
United States v. Setser, 568 F.3d 482, 493 (5th Cir. 2009).
Schofield, 486 F.2d at 91.
159
Martin v. Gard, 811 F.Supp. 616, 624 (D. Kan. 1993).
160
United States v. Merit Petroleum, Inc., 731 F.2d 901, 905 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984) (“The
mere existence of parallel ongoing civil and criminal investigations does not prevent the enforcement of
[an administrative agency’s] subpoena . . . absent special circumstances which demonstrate prejudice to
the substantial rights of [the affected party]. There [needs to be] evidence of agency bad faith or
malicious tactics.”).
161
DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 87 (9th Cir. 1963). The judiciary won’t interfere with public
policy regulations. Id. (“These grants of power are to[o] liberally construed in recognition of the vital
public purposes which they serve. . . . An investigation cannot be said to be ‘unnecessary’ if it may
contribute to the accomplishment of any of the purposes for which the Commissioner is authorized by
statute to make inquiry.”) (footnote omitted).
162
See id.
163
See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
164
Martin v. Gard, 811 F. Supp. 616, 620 (D. Kan. 1993) (“Once the agency has made its threshold
showing of these factors, then the court is to enforce the subpoena unless the respondent proves that the
subpoena is overly broad or burdensome; or that enforcement would constitute an abuse of the court’s
process. An abuse of process occurs when the administrative agency is acting for an improper purpose,
such as to harass or pressure settlement in a collateral matter, or any other purpose that lacks good
faith.”) (citations omitted).
165
United States v. RFB Petroleum, Inc., 703 F.2d 528, 531 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983) (“Before a
referral to the [Department of Justice] has been made, an administrative subpoena is issued for the
improper purpose of gathering information for a criminal case only if the issuing agency is found to have
formed an institutional commitment to refer the case, with a concurrent abandonment of any civil
[administrative] purpose. Furthermore, ‘the question of institutional purpose is one of fact.’”) (citations
omitted).
157
158
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reluctant to impede the general purpose of these agencies.166 These
generalized purposes, however, fail to explain the specific public purpose
served by a parallel investigation, especially in the absence of clear
legislative specifications.167
To illustrate, in a matter before the Eighth Circuit, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) received information regarding a savings
bank issuing sham loans.168 It notified the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”), who initiated a parallel administrative
investigation.169 After the FDIC located questionable loan documents, the
FBI subsequently requested the information for their criminal prosecution.170
Although the defendants argued that the FDIC was acting solely as an
“information-gathering” agency for the FBI, the court found that neither
investigation was improperly conducted.171 In light of the affirmative duties
imposed upon the FDIC by the legislature, that agency was entitled to
conduct its investigation within its “areas of responsibility.”172
Here again, there was no specific policy regarding the parallel
investigation, as long as the general policy objectives of each agency were
being fulfilled.173 Consider the following:
[A]n inquiry by the government for information—whether
sought by a request for “voluntary cooperation” or by
means of compulsion—almost always raises the specter of
parallel proceedings. Information gathered in the context of
a civil action seeking monetary sanction may lead to a
criminal prosecution seeking a prison term. Conversely,
information shared or surrendered in the criminal context
may hurt a defendant's cause in the civil action, where,
under certain circumstances, he may face equitable or
financial claims more damaging than the criminal penalties.
...
....
[In the area of securities law regulation and
enforcement,] [t]he Department of Justice has . . . become
166
Sandsend Fin. Consultants, Ltd. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 878 F.2d 875, 878–79 (5th Cir.
1989) (“When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it,
too, may inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. The court's inquiry is limited
to two questions: (1) whether the investigation is for a proper statutory purpose and (2) whether the
documents the agency seeks are relevant to the investigation.”) (citations omitted).
167
See SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1374, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
168
United States v. Copple, 827 F.2d 1182, 1186 (8th Cir. 1987).
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 1189.
172
Id.
173
Id.
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increasingly aggressive in its pursuit of entities and
individuals it believes to have violated the securities laws,
often working with regulatory agencies to gather
information and apply pressure to force a plea agreement. . .
. [It] now frequently asks target corporations to waive the
attorney-client privilege, dangling the carrot of a deferredprosecution agreement while brandishing the stick of
criminal indictment. . . .
....
[Although t]here is evidence that courts are growing
more circumspect of the power wielded by government
agencies pursuing concurrent civil and criminal
investigations . . . [t]ime will tell whether these decisions
presage a broader change in judicial sensitivity to the issues
criminal defendants face when litigating across forums.174
Arguably, the courts should focus attention on the extent to which
the sharing of information should occur between agencies during and after a
parallel investigation, even when the exchange occurs in the absence of dual
investigations.175 In addition, the legislative and judicial branches should
give greater attention to the potential effects the parallel investigatory
process has on the rights of the individual in both proceedings. 176 This is
because the current system allows for a near unrestricted means of access to
a regulated entity, such as a corporation, in the name of the public good,
forcing the corporation to prove the agency’s disentitlement under an ad hoc
standard of review. 177 Given the access to investigatory information, the
judicial branch should act, and not wait until the corporation proves that an
administrative agency is acting beyond its delegated authority. It should
require that a law enforcement agency prove its entitlement to use collected
information during and after a parallel investigation, or legitimately provide
174

Naftalis, supra note 19, at 1259–60.
United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 940 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Other circuits have agreed that
Fourth Amendment and possible due process limitations may be implicated in a dual investigation. . . .
Almost every other circuit has denied suppression, [however,] even when government agents did not
disclose the possibility or existence of a criminal investigation, so long as they made no affirmative
misrepresentations.”) (citations omitted).
176
See id. (citations omitted).
177
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311–12 (1978) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 7–8 (1977) (“The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as
well as private homes. To hold otherwise would belie the origin of that Amendment, and the American
colonial experience. . . . The general warrant was a recurring point of contention in the Colonies
immediately preceding the Revolution. The particular offensiveness it engendered was acutely felt by
the merchants and businessmen whose premises and products were inspected for compliance with the
several parliamentary revenue measures that most irritated the colonists. ‘[The] Fourth Amendment’s
commands grew in large measure out of the colonists’ experience with the writs of assistance . . . . [that]
granted sweeping power to customs officials and other agents of the King to search at large for smuggled
goods.’ Against this background, it is untenable that the ban on warrantless searches was not intended to
shield places of business as well as of residence.”) (citations omitted).
175

Published by eCommons, 2013

100

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

the affected party a clear point of entry into the administrative process prior
to the information exchange.178
III. REQUIRED RECORDS INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS
The collection and sharing of information has also raised concern
among affected parties regarding the application of the Fifth Amendment.179
In order to protect the public and ensure regulatory compliance, an affected
party is required to maintain certain records.180 By accepting a license to
practice a particular profession, or starting a business in a pervasively
regulated field, the party has “voluntarily” accepted the rules of the
regulatory environment.181 This interpretation pertaining to licensing has
allowed the courts to circumvent the affected party’s right against selfincrimination.182 Using the administrative agency’s subpoena power and
regulatory authority, a law enforcement agency can obtain any record that
the affected party is required to customarily keep.183 A full application of
the Fifth Amendment would, as the judiciary has stated, frustrate the
regulatory scheme and “public aspect” of the required records.184 As one
court stated:
[T]he required records exception [to the Fifth Amendment
may apply to administratively required records] despite the
self-incriminating and testimonial aspects of the production,
for the following reasons: (1) the public interest in obtaining
the information necessary to the regulatory scheme
outweighs the private interest in disclosure, and if a private
individual were able to invoke the privilege the regulatory
purpose of the scheme would be frustrated; (2) the
individual, by engaging in the regulated activity, is deemed
to have waived his privilege as to the production of those
records which are required to be kept; and (3) the individual
admits little of significance by the act of production because
of the public aspects of the documents. [Further,] the
required records exception to the Fifth Amendment
privilege [applies] to the act of production by a sole
proprietor even where the act of production could involve
compelled testimonial self-incrimination.185
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

Id. (citations omitted).
See Smith v. Richert, 35 F.3d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id.
Id. at 301–02.
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 63–65 (1968).
See United States v. Lehman, 887 F.2d 1328, 1333 (7th Cir. 1989).
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (U.S. v. Spano), 21 F.3d 226, 230 (8th Cir. 1994).
Id. (footnote omitted).
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Similar to the application of the Fourth Amendment, the
administrative agency may not utilize the required records doctrine to obtain
information solely for the purpose of a criminal prosecution.186 In fact, the
doctrine places the responsibility on the affected party to avoid
commingling private records, since the information contained in the
required records may be subjected to the agency’s subpoena power.187
While the affected party’s course of action may be to seek a protective order
to safeguard incriminating information,188 the courts tend to focus on the
testimonial nature of the information for the Fifth Amendment’s
application.189
In determining the extent to which the subpoena may affect the
incriminating private records, an arguable standard may be one of
reasonableness that “stops short of probable cause.”190 For example, a
defendant facing criminal investigation may decide to request a stay of the
administrative investigation,191 possibly to avoid issues associated with selfincrimination.192 The court then will have to balance the inequity arising
from the agency’s need to proceed against the harm to the defendant.193 As
noted by Warren:
The record-keeping and reporting requirements
have never faced serious legal challenges. The courts have
held in general that the record-keeping requirement does not
violate the Constitution as long as “there is a sufficient
relation between the activity sought to be regulated and the
public concern so that the government can constitutionally
regulate or forbid the basic activity concerned, and can
constitutionally require the keeping of particular records,
subject to inspection by the administration.”
....
186

See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 56–57 (1968).
See id.; see generally Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
See WEBB, supra note 10, at 14-6, 14-7.
189
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 418 (“History and principle teach that the privacy protected by the Fifth
Amendment extends not just to the individual’s immediate declarations, oral or written, but also to his
testimonial materials in the form of books and papers.”) (footnote omitted).
190
Parks v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 207, 214 (1st Cir. 1995), rehearing en banc granted,
opinion withdrawn (“In such cases, the Supreme Court has often utilized a reasonableness standard
which requires the government to articulate a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing by the target of the
search.”) (citations omitted).
191
See SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
192
COONEY, supra note 79, at 51 (“Those seeking a stay must show that a criminal investigation is
active or that indictment is likely, and must clearly demonstrate how continuation of civil or
administrative [action] would compel them to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege . . . . The Supreme
Court has ruled that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude the government from imposing both
civil and criminal sanctions based on the same behavior, as long as the civil sanction serves only a
remedial purpose [and does not inappropriately further the criminal goal of punishment]. . . . Although a
court will generally allow civil penalties that are greater than the loss the defendant’s action caused, a
penalty may be so excessive as to constitute a second punishment.”) (footnotes omitted).
193
See id.
187
188
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. . . Court rulings from the 1970s into the 2000s
have almost totally destroyed the idea that governmental
administrators could not compel the release of any business
records, as long as they were not of a purely personal nature
(for example, one’s personal diary). What constitutes
records of a purely personal nature has not been resolved as
[of] yet . . . .
. . . In Fisher [v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976)], the Internal Revenue Service was investigating
taxpayers (husband and wife) for possible civil or criminal
violations of federal income tax statutes. . . . Upon learning
that their accountants’ work papers were in the hands of
their attorneys, the IRS subpoenaed the work papers . . . .
. . . The Court reasoned that although the evidence
sought was incriminating in nature, the taxpayers were not
being compelled to produce the incriminating evidence
themselves.
....
During the same term, the Supreme Court, in
Andresen v. Maryland [, 427 U.S. 463 (1976)], immediately
affirmed its contention in Fisher that the Fifth Amendment’s
privilege against self-incrimination is not applicable when
the individual is not compelled to do anything in the
production of the incriminating evidence.
....
. . . [T]he holdings appear quite shocking from a
historical perspective, because these rulings have . . .
dampened the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination in areas previously enjoyed by individuals
under the Fifth: “Historically, the Fifth Amendment was
read to allow an individual a privacy interest in his personal
business papers. Now the Court has interpreted the Fifth
Amendment to allow the government to obtain indirectly
the information that it cannot obtain directly from the
individual, if the information leaves the individual’s
possession or is seized pursuant to a search warrant.” The
Fisher and Andresen decisions have apparently made
virtually all “private” business records the public’s
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business.194
In Fisher v. United States, the Court found that requiring the records
from the accountant did not serve to incriminate the taxpayers.195
Essentially, the reasoning rests on the proposition that documents produced
pursuant to a regulatory scheme do not necessarily provide affected parties a
clear avenue for a claim against self-incrimination.196 Instead, it left the
parties with the recourse of seeking a protective order to show that the
information was not compelled by a regulatory scheme and was produced
voluntarily or inadvertently.197 The Court found that “the Fifth Amendment
[was not] violated by the fact alone that the papers on their face might
incriminate the taxpayer, for the privilege protects a person only against
being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications.”198
Clearly, the Court did not favor protecting the documents, as it
reiterated the rule that there was no “special sanctity in papers” when it
addressed a similar issue in Andresen v. Maryland.199 Although not
specifically dealing with a parallel investigation, the Court noted that ruling
against allowing the seizure of a criminal defendant’s business records was
tantamount to undermining the principles it had announced in earlier
decisions allowing seizure.200 The specific issue for parallel investigations,
however, is not whether the records can be seized, but the manner in which
the records were created under the regulatory scheme.201
In a criminal investigation, the affected party is forewarned of its
Fifth Amendment rights.202
The same does not hold true in an
administrative agency investigation that necessitates the scrutiny of records
for purposes of determining a licensee’s compliance.203 To a large extent,
the purpose of the required records doctrine is to protect the public by
194

WARREN, supra note 4, at 528, 561, 562, 565 (emphasis in original) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
195
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976).
196
Id. at 409, 411–12.
197
Id. at 423 (Brennan, J., concurring).
198
Id. at 409 (majority opinion).
199
Id. at 407; see generally Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
200
Andreson, 427 U.S. at 474.
201
See generally Smith v. Richert, 35 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 1994).
202
United States v. Valdivieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d 316, 322–23 (D. P.R. 2007) (“The Fifth
Amendment privilege allows one not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding,
civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal
proceedings. . . . Testimony obtained in civil suits, or before administrative or legislative committees,
could [absent a grant of immunity] prove so incriminating that a person compelled to give such testimony
might readily be convicted on the basis of those disclosures in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The
Supreme Court has held that the failure to assert the privilege while giving testimony in civil suits, or
before administrative or legislative committees will forfeit the right to exclude the evidence in a
subsequent ‘criminal case.’ If the privilege could not be asserted in such situations, testimony given in
those judicial proceedings would be deemed ‘voluntary.’ Consequently, a party’s failure at any time to
assert the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination leaves him in no position to complain later
that he was compelled to give testimony against himself.”) (citations omitted).
203
See id. at 322.
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requiring information that ensures affected parties’ regulatory compliance.204
It does not concurrently signify that affected individuals cannot assert their
constitutional privileges against self-incrimination when providing
information that falls under regulatory disclosure.205 The judiciary tends to
overlook the specific disclosure issue by focusing on the “public aspect” of
the court’s reasoning, allowing information to be used by the law
enforcement agency to incriminate the affected party during a criminal
investigation without notice.206 In fact, the affected party has relinquished
any claim of self-incrimination through the information in the record simply
because the party has voluntarily entered the public industry and must
comply with the administrative agency’s regulatory policies.207 This
reasoning focuses on the affected party’s intent to assert compliance with
the regulatory scheme, and not on the operational waiver regarding selfincrimination.208
While the legislative intent of compelling the disclosure of
information through empowerment of an administrative agency is meant to
benefit the public through a specific regulation,209 the purpose for a law
enforcement agency in using the same information is strictly for
incriminatory purposes; that is, to usurp an individual’s civil liberties.210
The courts have used this “public aspect” of the required records as a bridge
between the parallel investigations, even though the affected party was
effectively compelled to disclose the information under a regulatory scheme,
though it may have voluntarily engaged in the regulated activity.211 Any
challenge by affected parties to this public aspect seems to summarily face a
high threshold of scrutiny.212 Similar to a challenge under the Fourth
Amendment, affected parties are left with having to prove that the agency
204

See Richert, 35 F.3d at 303.
See Valdivieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 322–23 (citations omitted).
206
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (United States v. Spano), 21 F.3d 226, 228 (8th Cir. 1994); see
also Richert, 35 F.3d at 304.
207
See Spano, 21 F.3d at 228; see generally Richert, 35 F.3d 300.
208
See Spano, 21 F.3d at 230; Richert, 35 F.3d at 302.
209
See Richert, 35 F.3d at 303–04.
210
Jefferson v. Dep’t of Justice, 284 F.3d 172, 182–83 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Randolph, J., dissenting)
(“Not every investigation will conclude that the target engaged in misconduct. And as with any agency
conducting law enforcement investigations, not every piece of information [collected] will constitute
evidence of illegal activity. In the course of investigating someone for committing a crime, the FBI for
instance might have its agents conduct investigations into the individual’s friends and associates, his
lifestyle, his spending habits and so forth. None of these inquiries will necessarily reveal criminal
activity, but there can be no doubt that the records thus compiled are for law enforcement purposes . . .
.”).
211
See Spano, 21 F.3d at 230.
212
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (McCoy and Sussman), 601 F.2d 162, 168 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[The
required records] doctrine does not lend itself to obliteration of the privilege against self-incrimination by
allowing any record to be required of any person; an individual may invoke the privilege if the records
required by law do not have ‘public aspects.’ Moreover, if the record-keeping requirement is directed at
a group inherently suspect of criminal activity, and a noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry is
patently not involved, the disclosure then has such a pervasive incriminatory effect that the [F]ifth
[A]mendment may be invoked.”).
205
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was acting beyond its delegated authority in requiring the records.213
Given current investigatory practices and the extent to which
information between agencies is shared, the application of the Fifth
Amendment in parallel investigations should be more carefully examined by
the judiciary. While the public purpose behind a regulatory scheme and
criminal enforcement authority may be similar, the particular methods of
investigation by these agencies are not the same.214 An administrative
agency may utilize an enforcement mechanism that mimics civil and
criminal elements,215 whereas the law enforcement agency must clearly
satisfy stricter constitutionally imposed requirements.216 The application of
the Fifth Amendment is fundamentally different by both agencies.217 For
instance, an affected party’s failure to disclose information under a required
record, or invoking the right to remain silent, could allow the agency to
argue the adverse inference of silence during an administrative
proceeding.218 As Cooney explained:
The Supreme Court has held that the fact that an individual
has invoked the privilege [against self-incrimination] and
declined to answer questions may not be used against that
individual in a criminal case. Thus, no prosecutor, judge, or
jury may draw an inference that a person is guilty from the
fact that he or she has invoked the privilege. A litigant in
[an administrative agency] case is not accorded the same
level of protection, however. Although a person retains the
absolute right to decline to answer questions, the fact finder
in [the administrative] case may draw an adverse inference
from the person’s silence.
. . . Statements an individual makes in the civil (or
213

See Spano, 21 F.3d at 230.
Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir. 1994) (“‘[The]
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of keeping criminal investigatory motives
from coloring administrative searches.’ . . . These cases make it very clear that an administrative search
may not be converted into an instrument which serves the very different needs of law enforcement
officials. If it could, then all of the protections traditionally afforded against intrusions by the police
would evaporate, to be replaced by the much weaker barriers erected between citizens and other
government agencies. It is because the missions of those agencies are less patently hostile to a citizen’s
interests than are the missions of the police that the barriers may be as weak as they are and still not
jeopardize Fourth Amendment guarantees.”) (citations omitted).
215
Atlas Roofing Co., v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 450
(1977); see also Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346, 1349 (5th Cir. 1970).
216
Paterno v. Lyons, 334 U.S. 314, 321 (1948) (“Procedural requirements are essential constitutional
safeguards in our system of criminal law. These safeguards should constantly and vigilantly be observed
to afford those accused of crime every fair opportunity to defend themselves.”); Withrow v. Williams,
507 U.S. 680, 695 (1993) (“We must remember in this regard that Miranda came down some 27 years
ago. In that time, law enforcement has grown in constitutional as well as technological sophistication,
and there is little reason to believe that the police today are unable, or even generally unwilling, to satisfy
Miranda's requirements.”) (citations omitted).
217
See COONEY, supra note 79, at 49.
218
Id.
214
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administrative) proceeding could then be used in the
criminal case as evidence against the individual or his or her
employer. But if the individual invokes the right to decline
to answer questions, that silence could be the basis of a
negative inference in the civil proceeding, and thus a
significant factor in the [agency’s] determination whether to
impose a penalty . . . .219
Two main defensive points surface against administrative subpoenas
for required records where: 1) pleading the Fifth Amendment is necessary to
avoid criminal liability in a parallel investigation, and 2) this course of
action is necessary to protect an affected party’s rights, as silence can be the
basis of an adverse inference in the administrative proceeding.220 To these
stated reasons, the courts responded in two different ways. First, the courts
have not allowed blanket individual coverage under the Fifth Amendment
(because the privilege does not apply to corporations),221 instead leaving the
burden on the affected party to prove entitlement.222 Second, “many courts
have concluded that the threat of adverse inferences does not demand a stay
of agency enforcement actions during parallel criminal proceedings[,]” nor
is there a due process violation where a party must choose whether to invoke
the right.223 These rationales require that the affected party create a
privileged log of each specific record, with a request for hearing on its
legitimacy,224 as well as seeking a protective order to avoid losing the
privilege.225
Unfortunately, the government continues to have the
opportunity to petition the judiciary for an order compelling the records.226
Arguably, the public purpose of a regulatory scheme can be
accomplished with stricter limits regarding use of the collected information
before disclosure to a law enforcement agency.227 In the event that an
219

Id. (footnotes omitted).
SEC v. Caramadre, 717 F. Supp. 2d 217, 221 (D. R.I.) (citing Baxter v Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,
318 (1976)); see also SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., No. 85-Civ.-8585(RO), 1987 WL 8655, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1987).
221
See generally Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
222
See Caramadre, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 221.
223
Id. at 222.
224
Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 232 (3rd Cir. 2008). Arguably, this could entail a
discussion of whether the affected party has liberty or proprietary due process claim. Id. (“‘[O]nce it is
determined that the Due Process Clause applies, ‘the question remains what process is due.’ In Mathews
v. Eldridge . . . the Supreme Court held that ‘identification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires the consideration of three distinct factors.’ Those factors are: First, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”) (emphasis
and citations omitted).
225
Caramadre, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
226
See SEC v. OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031, 1034–38 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
227
Tabaie, supra note 75, at 812. For instance:
although placing legislative barriers on the use of private documents by other
governmental agencies is helpful to prevent due process violations when private
220
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affected party can proffer the incriminatory nature of the required record,
then the burden of showing probable cause from independent sources should
at least be placed on the law enforcement agency.228 The public policy
reason for affirmatively limiting disclosure would be to highlight the higher
level of scrutiny required for documents collected by a law enforcement
agency than that of an administrative agency.229
Such a specific policy consideration is currently present to some
degree in the Freedom of Information Act,230 where certain records are
exempt from disclosure during an administrative investigation.231 In
applying the exemption, a distinction is drawn between records that are
routine in nature, and those that depart from the routine operation and
oversight of the agency.232 Once the agency focuses its attention on a
particular party, an investigation may be underway for purposes of the
investigatory records exception.233 At the time an affected party is under
investigation (in any manner or subject to similar circumstances), he or she
should be entitled to claim a distinction between regulatory compliance and
that of the Fifth Amendment.234
This type of distinction should at least be scrutinized by the
judiciary where the statutory authority of the administrative and law
enforcement agencies are identical or substantially similar.235 While the
penalties for an administrative or criminal violation are certainly distinct, the
statutory language under criminal codes usually focuses on the issue of
intent.236
The clear separation between each agency’s independent
investigations can be used to foster impartiality in the collection of records
papers are used in parallel investigations, these limitations do not solve the
essential privacy problem. People should be secure that their private documents
remain private even though the documents may be relevant. To say that [an
administrative agency] can review personal documents, so long as they are not
allowed to share the information with other governmental agencies, merely
restricts the privacy violation rather than truly protecting the documents.
Id.

228

United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158, 165 (D. Md. 1980) (“A lower standard of probable
cause is constitutionally permissible in the administrative inspection context because the intrusion into an
individual’s privacy is less than that in the criminal context, and is outweighed by the public’s interest in
the regulatory program. But once the purpose behind the search shifts from administrative compliance to
a quest for evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, the government may constitutionally enter the
premises only upon securing a warrant supported by full probable cause.”) (citations omitted).
229
See Jefferson v. Dep't of Justice, Office of Prof'l Responsibility, 284 F.3d 172, 182–83 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (Randolph, J., dissenting).
230
See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
231
Ctr. for Nat’l Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 372 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
232
Id. at 373.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
See Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“It is not unusual for Congress
to provide for both criminal and administrative penalties in the same statute and to permit the imposition
of civil sanctions without proof of the violator’s knowledge.”) (footnote omitted).
236
See id.; see also United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670, 671 (1877).
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by an administrative agency.237 In light of the burden of proof required for a
law enforcement agency, clear notice and an opportunity to be heard on the
issues of incrimination should be provided to the affected party by each
agency prior to the exchange of information.238
IV. CONCLUSION
When policy reasons become the basis for an expansion of
administrative authority, the legal community should approach it with some
degree of apprehension.239 Undoubtedly, administrative law is comprised of
aspects from both civil and criminal law.240 However, the information
gathering process and the applicability of collected information within the
current legal framework has allowed law enforcement agencies access,
without clear oversight, to an expansive continuum of information gathered
by administrative agencies. This is not to suggest that parallel investigations
should be automatically prohibited as intrusive into individual rights.
Indeed, there are certainly instances where an exchange of information
would be beneficial to the public welfare, such as white-collar
investigations241 or professional licensing issues.242 Properly conceived and
237

See Iran Air, 996 F.2d at 1258; Fox, 95 U.S. at 671.
See Bialek v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 1267, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The privilege against selfincrimination, of course, ‘can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial,
investigatory or adjudicatory.’ . . . An individual’s decision to invoke the privilege is always one of
personal choice no matter which agency takes the investigatory lead, and the effect of concurrent
jurisdiction on that decision would be speculative and likely inconsequential.”) (citation omitted); see
also United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 940 (9th Cir. 2008).
239
See generally von Rochow-Leuschner, supra note 112; see generally Gustafson, supra note 114.
240
United States v. Valdivieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d 316, 322–23 (D. P.R. 2007).
241
Regarding federal white-collar crime enforcement, the Attorney General issued a memorandum
which stated the following:
In order to maximize the efficient use of resources, it is essential that our attorneys
consider whether there are investigative steps common to civil and criminal
prosecutions, and to agency administrative actions, and that they discuss all
significant issues that might have a bearing on the matter as a whole with their
colleagues. When appropriate, criminal, civil, and administrative attorneys should
coordinate an investigative strategy that includes prompt decisions on the merits of
criminal and civil matters; sensitivity to grand jury secrecy, tax disclosure
limitations and civil statutes of limitation; early computation and recovery of the
full measure of the Government’s losses; prevention of the dissipation of assets;
global settlements; proper use of discovery; and compliance with the Double
Jeopardy Clause. By bringing additional expertise to our efforts, expanding our
arsenal of remedies, increasing program integrity and deterring future violations,
we represent the full range of the Government’s interests.
Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. on Coordination of Parallel Criminal, Civil, and Admin.
Proceedings (July 28, 1997), http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/970728.htm.
242
For example, in the same year of the housing market crash of 2008, the State of Florida
investigated the background of mortgage broker licensees in the State. It found that many of the brokers
suspected of conducting mortgage fraud had criminal records which had not been thoroughly investigated
prior to licensure. The State of Florida’s Chief Inspector General’s Office found that the agency
responsible for regulating the brokers had ignored potentially valid citizen complaints and granted
licenses to hundreds of brokers without thoroughly investigating their criminal backgrounds, even though
much of the information was accessible through the State’s law enforcement agencies. Without
highlighting potential concerns, which have already been addressed in this Article, the recommendation
of the Inspector General was that the administrative agency attempt to work more closely with law
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implemented, a system of agency cooperation can be accomplished, while at
the same time ensuring the protection of individual liberties in accordance
with proper legal standards.243
For example, during an administrative investigation, an agency
procedure defined by statute could allow for the referral of complaints to
other agencies, or other internal or external resources. This referral is likely
to facilitate investigation without the specific exchange of investigatory
materials that violate the affected party rights and the opportunity to protect
the public interests.244 The private interests should not simply be
outweighed by the public policy reasons for regulation or criminal
enforcement, as long as these agencies are acting in “good faith.”245 The
current standards and protocols do not readily protect the rights of the
individual.246
Hence, the judicial and legislative branches, which were created to
ensure that our system of government effectuated balance with the executive
branch, should seek to redress the imbalances that exist between
administrative and law enforcement agencies, especially as to those that
relate to self-incrimination and burden of proof.247 Given the inherent nature
of administrative agencies to conduct affairs as a veritable fourth branch of
government, the other branches have a stronger incentive to ensure that
these agencies actually practice a stronger and more well-defined notion of
good faith.248

enforcement agencies instead of simply referring cases. See Inspector General’s Office Report to the
Governor on the Office of Financial Regulation, Case Number 2008-07290003 (Chief Inspector General
September 15, 2008) (the report also reviewed information received by the news media, which was
consistent with the conclusions documented).
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See id.
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See United States v. Rutherford, 555 F.3d 190, 198 (6th Cir. 2009). “[G]iven the substantial
likelihood that [administrative and law enforcement agencies] may intentionally blend its civil and
criminal arms in conducting an investigation, [the courts] must strongly encourage [these agencies] to
observe and protect the public's constitutional rights when exercising its power.” Id. at 200 (Cole, J.
concurring).
245
United States v. Gel Spice Co., 773 F.2d 427, 433 (2d Cir. 1985); see generally Smith v. Richert,
35 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 1994).
246
United States v. Lazar, No. 04–20017–DV, 2006 WL 3761803, at *17 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 20,
2006) (“In many respects, agency officials and prosecutors have become so entwined in federal criminal
law enforcement that agencies sometimes act as de facto prosecutors, if not outright prosecutorial
delegatees . . . .”) (emphasis included).
247
STEVEN J. CANN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 273 (4th ed. 2006) (“The founding fathers attempted to
control the discretion of those in power through a written constitution and the concept of separation of
powers. These concepts do not have much application to modern agencies in the administrative state.
Legislative delegations of power, which should serve the channeling purposes of the Constitution, are
written so loosely and vaguely as to impose almost no constraints at all on agency behavior. There is no
separation of powers within agencies (agencies make rules, enforce the rules they make, and adjudicate
infractions of those rules). Agencies may, however, be checked by the other branches, as in
congressional review, the Office of Management and Budget’s review, and judicial review.”).
248
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 984–85 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
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